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WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
The Right to Counsel-Time for
Recognition Under the Due
Process Clause
Felix Rackow
THOSE WHOSE business it is to follow the proceedings of the United
States Supreme Court should be grateful for the fact that the members of
the Court have seen fit to give us an unequivocal statement of what the
right to counsel means under the sixth amendment. Ever since the de-
cision of Johnson v. Zerbst' in 1938, the provision that "in all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall... have the Assistance of Counsel for his
defence" means that federal courts lose their jurisdiction over the de-
fendant if he does not
have counsel.
THE AUTHOR (B.S., M.A., Ph.D., Cornell Uni- However, the clarity
versity) is an Assistant Professor of Political disappears when one wishes
Science, Western Reserve University. to determine whether the
United States Constitution
guarantees defendants in the state courts the same right to counsel. The
Constitution, of course, does not expressly state such a right, but those
who believe that "right to counsel" exists in state courts are of the
opinion that it has been incorporated into the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment. It is not the purpose of this study to examine the
question of whether or not those in Congress who proposed the four-
teenth amendment and those who voted in the state legislatures in favor
of its ratification intended by their votes to make the Bill of Rights
applicable to the states. Much scholarship has already been expended on
this point, and little can be said that has not already been brought out.2
It is sufficient to say that up to and including the present time there has
never been a majority on the Supreme Court that would hold that the
1. 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
2. See, e.g., on the positive side, FLACK, THE ADOPTION OF THE FOURTEENTH
AmENDMENT (1908); Justice Black's dissent in Adamson v. California, 332 U.S.
46, 68-123 (1947. On the negative side, see Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amend-
ment Incorporate the Bill of Rights?- The Original Understanding, 2 STAN. L
REv. 5 (1949); Morrison, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of
Rights?- The Judicial Interpretation, 2 STAN. L. REv. 140 (1949). For an ex-
cellent discussion of the futility of this line of investigation, see Charles Warren, The
New "Liberty" Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 39 HARv. L. REv. 431-65
(1926).
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provisions of the first eight amendments were incorporated into the
fourteenth.3 Nevertheless, the constitutional right of a defendant in a
state court to have the assistance of counsel is dependent upon the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment, and a study of the relation-
ship between the two is the object of this paper.
FouRTEENTH AMENDMENT - THE ASORPTION OF
FuNDAmENTAL RIGHTS
The rule of law established in Barron -v. Baltimore,4 viz., that the
first eight amendments are limitations on the authority of the federal
government and have no application to the states, is still sound law today.
In the light of this rule, the Supreme Court has refused to make the fol-
lowing provisions of the Bill of Rights applicable to the states: the right
to a grand jury indictment; 5 the right to a trial by jury;6 protection
against compulsory self-incrimination; 7 and protection against double
jeopardy-"
On the other hand, ever since the Supreme Court announced its de-
cision in Gitlow v. New York 9 in 1925, the Court has incorporated other
provisions contained in the Bill of Rights into the "liberty" that is pro-
tected by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Among
these are: freedom of speech; 10 freedom of religion;" freedom of the
press; 12 freedom to assemble peacefully;' 3 and the right to be protected
from unreasonable searches and seizures. 14 In addition, certain practices
which are required under the due process clause of the fifth amendment
are also required under that of the fourteenth. Among these are: the
right to have fair compensation for private property condemned through
3. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947); Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S.
78 (1908); Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581 (1900).
4. 7 Peters (U.S.) 243 (1833).
5. Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884).
6. Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581 (1900).
7. Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908).
8. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937). Justice Cardozo, however, did not
completely close the door. The sentence "What the answer would have to be if the
state were permitted after a trial free from error to try the accused over again or to
bring another case against him, we have no occasion to consider," may someday pro-
vide the peg for including the protection against double jeopardy within the mean-
ing of due process.
9. 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
10. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
11. Hamilton v. University of California, 293 U.S. 245 (1934).
12. Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936)
13. De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937).
14. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
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eminent domain actions; 15 the right of an accused to be heard in his own
defense; 16 and the right to adequate notice and hearing.1
7
In the Gitlow case, Justice Sanford states for the Court that "for
present purposes we may and do assume that freedom of speech and of
the press - which are protected by the First Amendment from abridge-
ment by Congress - are among the fundamental personal rights and
'liberties' protected by the due process clause of the Fourtenth Amend-
ment from impairment by the States."' 8  If Barron v. Baltimore is still
the law of the land, it is understandable that the Supreme Court has re-
fused to state that all the provisions of the Bill of Rights are protected
by the Federal Constitution from being abridged by the states. But,
then, is the Court being inconsistent in view of the fact that since the
Gitlow case the Court has ruled that the states cannot abridge the free-
doms of the first amendment? The Supreme Court asserts this is not in-
consistent. According to the Court it is merely coincidental that these
latter rights, which the states are prohibited from denying, are also pro-
tected from Federal abridgement by virtue of the Bill of Rights; for the
protection against state abridgement rests upon a different principle.
The answer to the Court's pseudo-contradiction is found in a long
line of decisions, but the principal cases for our purpose are Hebert v.
Louisiana'9 and Palko v. Connecticut.20 In the Hebert case, a unanimous
Court expounded that the due process of law clause of the fourteenth
amendment merely required that state action be ". . . consistent with the
fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all
our civil and political institutions and not infrequently are designated as
'law of the land."' 2 '
In Palko v. Connecticut, the appellant alleged that the fourteenth
amendment incorporated all the provisions of the first eight amendments,
heretofore directed only to the Federal Government, and thus, made them
15. Chicago B. & Q. R.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897).
16. Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366 (1898).
17. Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908).
18. Gidow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925). Cf. Justice Harlan's dissent
in Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 465 (1907): "I go further and hold that
the privileges of free speech and of a free press, belonging to every citizen of the
United States, constitute essential parts of every man's liberty, and are protected
against violation by that clause of the Fourteenth Amendment forbidding a state to
deprive any person of his liberty without due process of law. It is, I think, impos-
sible to conceive of liberty, as secured by the Constitution against hostile action,
whether by the Nation or by the States, which does not embrace the right to enjoy
free speech and the right to have a free press."
19. 272 U.S. 312 (1926).
20. 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
21. Hebert v. Louisiana, 272 U.S. 312, 316-17 (1926).
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applicable to the states. Justice Cardozo, speaking for the majority, re-
jected this thesis, and expanded on the formula announced in the Hebert
case. He distinguished between those rights which constitute "funda-
mental principles of liberty and justice" and those which base their
existence merely on the fiat of some constiutional or statutory provision.
In the latter group he placed grand jury indictment, compulsory self-
incrimination, jury trial, and double jeopardy;22 in the former, the pro-
visions of the first amendment and the right to counsel 3  "The right
to trial by jury and the immunity from prosecution except as the result of
an indictment may have value and importance. Even so, they are not of
the very essence of a scheme of ordered liberty. To abolish them is not
to violate a 'principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience
of our people as to be ranked as fundamental' ... Few would be so nar-
row or provincial as to maintain that a fair and enlightened system of
justice would be impossible without them."2 4 However, when we come
to the other group, we find that they are included within the meaning
of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment because "few
would be so narrow or provincial as to maintain that a fair and en-
lightened system of justice" would be possible without them. Thus,
... . it is possible that some of the rights safeguarded by the first
eight Amendments against National action may also be safeguarded
against state action, because a denial of them would be a denial of due
process of law . . . . If this is so, it is not because those rights are
enumerated in the first eight Amendments, but because they are of such
a nature that they are included in the conception of due process of
law.=
"If the Fourteenth Amendment had absorbed them [first eight amend-
ments], the process of absorption has had ,its source in the belief that
neither liberty nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed. '26
RIGHT TO COUNSEL - A FUNDAMENTAL RiGHT?
The question then is, on which side of the dividing line does the right
to counsel fall? Is the right to counsel "of the very essence of a scheme
of ordered liberty" or is it such that "few would be so narrow or pro-
vincial as to maintain that a fair and enlightened system of justice
would be impossible without [it]?" Although there are some obiter
dicta (as in the Palko case) that place the right to counsel in the
22. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 323-4 (1937).
23. Id. at 324, 326-27.
24. Id. at 325.
25. Id. at 326, citing Justice Moody in Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 99
(1908).
26. Ibid.
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"fundamental" group,27 the Supreme Court answers the question by say-
ing that ordinarily the right to counsel is not fundamental to liberty.
It is ironic, therefore, that while the Court adopted the principle Justice
Cardozo used in making his classification, it has rejected his conclusion
in placing the right to counsel within the "fundamental" class. Never-
theless, under the circumstances of a particular case, the deprivation of
the right to counsel may result in a fundamental unfairness, and when it
does, such deprivation does violate due process in the fourteenth amend-
ment.
Reasoning that a hearing before conviction is basic to due process,
and that a prisoner without the aid of counsel does not get the full
benefit of a hearing, the Supreme Court declared in Powell v. Alabama
that "a consideration of the nature of the right [to counsel] and a re-
view of the expressions of this and other courts, makes it clear that the
right to the aid of counsel is of this fundamental character [so as to war-
rant it being included within the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment] ."28 This sweeping declaration, however, was severely
limited in Betts v. Brady2 9 and Bute v. Illinois.30  In the Betts case the
Court faced the specific question with which we are concerned: "whether
due process of law demands that in every case, whatever the circumstances,
a State must furnish counsel to an indigent defendant. Is the furnishing
of counsel in all cases whatever dictated by natural, inherent, and funda-
mental principles of fairness?"''3 Justice Roberts made an historical
survey of the practice of the American colonies and the states and con-
cluded, that while the states permitted defendants the assistance of self-
chosen counsel, the evidence indicated that the states generally did not
feel obligated to assign counsel to the defendant as a matter of constitu-
tional right. He then wrote that
.... the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the conviction and incarcera-
tion of one whose trial is offensive to the common and fundamental
ideas of fairness and right, and while want of counsel in a particular
case may result in a conviction lacking such fundamental fairness, we
cannot say that the Amendment embodies an inexorable command that
27. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 324 (1937); Brown v. Mississippi, 297
U.S. 278, 285-6 (1936); Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 244
(1936); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68 (1932); Cooke v. United States, 267
U.S. 517, 537 (1925).
28. 287 U.S. 45, 68 (1932). This statement must be considered dictum, as the
Powell decision was expressly limited to capital cases where the defendant was in-
capable of defending himself. Id. at 71.
29. 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
30. 333 U.S. 640 (1948).
31. Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 464 (1942).
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no trial for any offense, or in any court, can be fairly conducted and
justice accorded a defendant who is not represented by counsel.'
Thus the Court enunciated its view of due process as requiring no more
than a fair trial, which may or may not under a particular circumstance
require counsel. Six years later the Supreme Court said essentially the
same thing in Bute v. Illinois.
3 3
A review of the cases in which the Supreme Court has reversed con-
victions in the state courts because of the denial of counsel indicates that
the Court has consistently followed its "fair trial" rule. The Court has
reversed only when there were unusual circumstances present that rend-
ered the proceedings a violation "of the very essence of a scheme of
ordered liberty." Thus, when the -issues are so complex that an un-
counseled defendant would not be accorded a fair trial, the court must ap-
point counsel to aid the defendant.3 4 Assignment must be made when
the defendant is charged with a serious offense, especially when the of-
fense may result in capital punishment.3 5 When a defendant, who is
without counsel, does not have his interests protected by the court, then
a conviction under such circumstances would deny due process.3 6 The in-
advertent or intentional deception by officers or the court will taint the
conviction of an uncounseled defendant.37 The Supreme Court has re-
versed the convictions of defendants without counsel, when they did not
progress very far in schooling,3 s when they were semi-illiterate,39 or when
they suffered from mental disorders.40 The court is more solicitous in
seeing to it that young people are defended by counsel than it is in
32. Id. at 473. "That which may, in one setting, constitute a denial of fundamental
fairness, shocking to the universal sense of justice, may, in other circumstances, and
in the light of other considerations, fall short of such denial." Id. at 462.
33. Bute v. Illinois, 333 U.S. 640, 656-9 (1948), citing Palko v. Connecticut, 302
U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
34. Moore v. Michigan, 355 U.S. 155 (1957); Pennsylvania ex rel. Herman v.
Claudy, 350 U.S. 116 (1956); Rice v. Olson, 324 U.S. 786 (1945); Tomkins v.
Missouri, 323 U.S. 485 (1945); William v. Kaiser, 323 U.S. 471 (1945).
35. Moore v. Michigan, 355 U.S. 155 (1957); Marino v. Ragen, 332 U.S. 561
(1947); De Meerleer v. Michigan, 329 U.S. 663 (1947); Tomkins v. Missouri, 323
U.S. 485 (1945); Williams v. Kaiser, 323 U.S. 471 (1945).
36. Gibbs v. Burke, 337 U.S. 773 (1949).
37. Palmer v. Ashe, 342 U.S. 134 (1951); Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736
(1948); Smith v. O'Grady, 312 U.S. 329 (1941).
38. Moore v. Michigan, 355 U.S. 155 (1957); Herman v. Claudy, 350 U.S. 116
(1956).
39. Reece v. Georgia, 350 U.S. 85 (1955); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45
(1932).
40. Massey v. Moore, 348 U.S. 105 (1954); Palmer v. Ashe, 342 U.S. 134
(1951).
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respect of older defendants.41 Although the right to counsel may be
waived by the defendant, the record must indicate that it was done so
intelligently.42 It would abridge due process if a defendant is not given
the opportunity to provide counsel at his own expense,43 and counsel
must be allowed to be present at every stage of the proceedings. 44
The attitude of the majority of the Supreme Court has been well sum-
marized by Justice Frankfurter:
It is not for us to suggest that it might be desirable to offer to every
accused . . . the opportunities for counsel and to enter with formality
upon the record the deliberate disclaimer of his need for counsel ...
Our duty does not go beyond safeguarding "rights essential to a fair
hearing" by the States. After all, due plocess . . . is not to be turned
into a destructive dogma in the administration of systems of criminal
justice under which the States have lived not only before the Four-
teenth Amendment but for the eighty years since its adoption.'
That the "fair trial" rule is at best an indefinite standard, subject
to many interpretations, is of no concern to the Court's majority. Jus-
tice Reed noted that it was not up to the Supreme Court to change its
decisions because state prosecuting authorities are "uncertain as to
whether to offer counsel to all accused who are without funds and
under serious charges in state courts. We cannot offer a panacea for
the difficulty. Such an interpretation would be an unwarranted federal in-
trusion into state control of its criminal procedure. The due process
clause is not susceptible to a mathematical formula. ' 46  And, returning
to Justice Frankfurter, "After all, this is the Nation's ultimate judicial
tribunal, not a super-legal-aid bureau."47
However, a consistently large minority48 of the Supreme Court refuses
to accept the reasoning of the majority. Rejecting the "fair trial" rule,
some would go so far as to say that fourteenth amendment incorporates
all the provisions of the first eight amendments, and thus makes them
applicable to the states as well as the federal government.49 Others would
41. Moore v. Michigan, 355 U.S. 155 (1957); Uveges v. Pennsylvania, 335 U.S.
437 (1948); Wade v. Mayo, 334 U.S. 672 (1948); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S.
45 (1932).
42. Moore v. Michigan, 355 U.S. 155 (1957).
43. Chandler v. Fretag, 348 U.S. 3 (1954); Hawk v. Olson, 326 U.S. 271 (1945);
House v. Mayo, 324 U.S. 42 (1945).
44. Chessman v. Teets, 354 U.S. 156 (1957).
45. Foster v. Illinois, 332 U.S. 134, 138-9 (1947).
46. Gibbs v. Burke, 337 U.S. 773 (1949).
47. Dissenting in Uveges v. Pennsylvania, 335 U.S. 437, 449-50 (1948).
48. This minority reached its peak strength during the years that Justices Black,
Douglas, Murphy, and Rutledge served on the Court together.
49. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 71-2, 124 (1947).
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go at least as far as to place the right to counsel on that side of the divid-
ing line which would require under due process that whenever an un-
counseled indigent defendant appears in the state courts to answer a
criminal charge, the courts must assign counsel before the action can
proceed.50
The minority members of the Court refer to the reasoning in Powell
v. Alabama to the effect that "[E]ven the intelligent and educated lay-
man has small and sometimes no skill in the science of law... He re-
quires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings
against him. Without it, though he be not guilty, he faces the danger
of conviction because he does not know how to establish his innocence."51
Indeed, this was the reasoning adopted by the majority in Johnson v.
Zerbst which made such an assignment mandatory in the federal courts:
The Sixth Amendment guarantees that 'In all criminal prosecutions,
the accused shall enjoy the right ... to have the Assistance of Counsel
for his defence.' This is one of the safeguards of the Sixth Amendment
deemed necessary to insure fundamental human rights of life and liberty.
. . . It embodies a realistic recognition of the obvious truth that the
average defendant does not have the professional legal skill to protect
himself when brought before a tribunal with power to take his life or
liberty, wherein the prosecution is presented by experienced and learned
counsel. That which is simple, orderly and necessary to the lawyer -
to the untrained layman - may appear intricate, complex and mys-
terious. Consistently with the wise policy of the Sixth Amendment and
other parts of our fundamental charter, this Court has pointed to
'... the humane policy of the modern criminal law.. .' which now pro-
vides that defendant '... . if he be poor, ... may have counsel furnished
him by the state ... not infrequently . . . more able than the attorney
for the state."'
The rationale behind all this, the minority believes, is not so much that
counsel is required in federal courts because of the Sixth Amendment,
but that counsel is required because a hearing - with the aid of coun-
50. In Palmer v. Ashe, 342 U.S. 134 (1951), Justice Black states: "It was pointed
out in the Uveges opinion that the minority of the Court believe that the Fourteenth
and Sixth Amendments require both state and federal courts to afford defendants in
all criminal procesutions the assistance of counsel for their defense." See Justice
Douglas' dissent in Bute v. Illinois, 333 U.S. 640 (1948); Justice Rutledge's dissent
in Foster v. Illinois, 332 U.S. 134 (1947); Justice Murphy's dissent in Canizio v.
New York, 327 U.S. 82 (1946); and Justice Black's dissent in Betts v. Brady, 316
U.S. 455 (1942).
The many changes in the Court since the deaths of Justices Murphy and Rut-
ledge may have altered this division. Justices Black and Douglas still believe in
reversing the Barron rule and making the Bill of Rights applicable to the States. It
is interesting to note that Chief Justice Warren cast his vote for the defendant in all
seven of the right to counsel cases in which he participated, as did Justices Brennan
and Whittaker who took part in three and two right to counsel cases respectively.
51. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932).
52. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462-3 (1938).
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sel - is required by due process of law; the right to counsel clause of
the sixth amendment, therefore, is really an implementation of the fifth.
If this is so, then Justice Douglas can say that:
I do not think that constitutional standards of fairness depend upon
what court an accused is in .... If due process as defined in the Bill of
Rights requires appointment of counsel to represent defendants in fed-
eral prosecutions, due process demands that the same be done in state
prosecutions. The basic requirements for fair trials are those which
the Framers deemed so important to procedural due process that they
wrote them into the Bill of Rights and thus made it impossible for
either legislatures or courts to tinker with them. I fail to see why it
is due process to deny an accused the benefit of counsel in a state
court when by constitutional standards that benefit could not be with-
held from him in a federal cour m'
Moreover, the minority believes that to follow the "fair trial" rule of
the majority means that "[p]overty or wealth will make all the difference
in securing the substance or only the shadow of constitutional protec-
tion."54 In Avery v. Alabama a unanimous Court held that "[h] ad peti-
tioner been denied any representation of counsel at all, such a clear viola-
tion of the Fourteenth Amendment's guaranty of assistance of counsel
would have required reversal of his conviction."55
Two years later, in Betts v. Brady, the majority concluded that the
right to counsel provisions in the early state constitutions merely meant
that a defendant could have counsel if he supplied his own.5 6 This as-
pect of the right to counsel is, of course, important, but the minority be-
lieves that it does not go far enough: if it would abridge due process to
deny an accused the assistance of counsel when he can afford to purchase
such assistance, democratic procedure and logic also demand that the state
be required to assign counsel to the indigent. "A practice cannot be
reconciled with 'common and fundamental ideals of fairness and rights,'
which would subject innocent men to increased dangers of conviction
merely because of their poverty.157
The Chandler case 58 seems to support the minority's contention that
under the "fair trial" rule there is a correlation between the definition of
"fair" and the wealth of the defendant. In this case, the Supreme Court
unanimously reversed the defendant's conviction as an habitual criminal
because the Tennessee courts denied him the opportunity to supply his
own counsel. Chandler had been indicted on a charge of housebreaking
53. Bute v. Illinois, 333 U.S. 640, 678-9 (1948); dissent by Justice Douglas.
54. Justice Rutledge dissenting in Foster v. Illinois, 332 U.S. 134, 142 (1947).
55. 308 U.S. 444, 445 (1940).
56. 316 U.S. 455, 465 (1942).
57. Justice Black dissenting in Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 476 (1942).
58. Chandler v. Fretag, 348 U.S. 3 (1954).
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and larceny, an offence punishable by three to ten years. On the day of
his trial, he was ready to plead guilty and "felt that an attorney could do
him no good on said charge." At his trial, the judge orally told him that
he would also be tried as a habitual criminal because of three alleged
prior felonies and that conviction of the second charge carried a manda-
tory life sentence with no possibility of parole. Chandler immediately
asked for a continuance so that he could obtain counsel on the habitual
criminal charge. This was refused, the jury was impanelled, and less than
ten minutes later, Chandler was found guilty on both charges. All the
Tennessee courts upheld the conviction, emphasizing the point that the
Habitual Criminal Act did not create a separate offense but merely in-
creased the punishment upon a defendant's conviction of a fourth felony;
thus, a waiver of counsel on the fourth offense also constituted a waiver
on the habitual criminal charge. The Supreme Court reversed the Ten-
nessee courts. Pointing out that the Act called for a jury determination,
in a judicial hearing, of the habitual criminal charge, the Court noted
that the two "are essentially independent of each other" and may require
separate defenses. Since the defendant asked for a continuance to obtain
counsel to assist him in the habitual criminal charge as soon as he heard
of the charge, it is clear that he did not waive counsel for the second
charge. Due process requires that the defendant be given an opportu-
nity to be heard. A corollary is that he must also be given the oppor-
tunity to employ counsel and consult with him. In short, the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment guarantees you the right to have the
assistance of counsel, if you can afford to employ one; if you are in-
digent, however, the same clause requires the assignment of counsel only
when the Supreme Court is willing to say that the trial was unfair with-
out such assistance.
While the minority applaud the fact that the majority of the Court
agree that due process requires that state courts appoint counsel to assist
indigent defendants when a capital offense is involved,509 the minority
also believes that assignment of counsel is required when less serious
charges are made. The majority anticipated this attack declaring that to
apply the federal rule to state court procedure would mean that the states
would not be able to distinguish between a traffic violation and a capital
charge when a defendant requests that counsel be assigned.6" To this
Justice Douglas replies that:
[ilt might not be nonsense to draw the Betts v. Brady line somewhere
between that case and the case of one charged with violation of a park-
ing ordinance, and to say that accused is entitled to counsel in the for-
59. See note 35, supra.
60. Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 473 (1942).
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mer but not in the latter. But to draw the line between this case [in-
volving twenty years imprisonment] and cases where the maximum
penalty is death, is to make a distinction which makes no sense in
terms of the absence or presence of -need for counsel. Yet it is the
need for counsel that establishes the real standard for determining
whether the lack of counsel rendered the trial unfair.'
The minority views notwithstanding, the fact remains that the Su-
preme Court still adheres to the "fair trial" rule, and this in turn means
that the right to counsel is not of such a fundamental nature that it falls
within the meaning of the "liberty" that is protected by the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment. Under certain circumstances due
process may be abridged if a defendant does not have the aid of counsel;
but this is not enough to establish that due process requires that the states
assign counsel to all indigent defendants accused of crime. Although the
majority of the members of the Supreme Court believe that in the federal
courts "[tihe right to have the assistance of counsel is too fundamental
and absolute to allow courts to indulge in nice calculations as to the
amount of prejudice arising from its denial,"62 the Supreme Court is will-
ing to make such calculations in criminal cases arising in the state courts.
WHY R IGHT TO COUNSEL?
Fundamentally there are two reasons for the existence of a right to
counsel although they are really different aspects of the same problem.
First, an assumption underlying the right to counsel is that the layman
needs protection from the complexities of the legal system under which
he lives. The defendant may be ignorant of the rights that are granted
to him by the legal system, and he therefore needs the guidance of one
who is trained in the law to guard against the involuntary waiver of
such rights. Moreover, even if the defendant does know of his legal
rights, he may become so hopelessly confused in following the different
paths of the law that he may unintentionally lose the advantages that our
accusatorial system of law affords him. Unless trained in the law, one
accused of crime may not be able to understand the technicalities of the
indictment, nor whether it is sufficient. Furthermore, the defendant may
not know of the possible defenses to the crime for which he is charged.
One accused of murder probably knows whether or not he killed some-
one, but does he know of such mitigating circumstances as justifiable
homicide, or how to raise the defense of insanity? Does he know that
self-defense is raised under a plea of not guilty, or that sufficient provo-
cation may reduce the offense to voluntary manslaughter? The lay de-
fendant probably would not be able to recognize hearsay evidence even
61. Justice Douglas dissenting in Bute v. Illinois, 333 U.S. 640, 682 (1948).
62. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 76 (1942).
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if he knew what it was; nor would he know how to cross-examine or at-
tack the credibility of the prosecutions witnesses. He would not know
how to move to set aside the verdict, to move for a new trial, or to move
for an appeal. Thus, unless trained in the law, a defendant may not
know how to put into motion the machinery of the court that will give
him the compulsory processes to which he is entitled.
A second assumption behind the right to counsel is that the layman
accused of crime needs protection from overzealous prosecutors. It is a
common observation that district attorneys, elected to their offices, be-
lieve that the voters judge their careers on the basis of the number of
convictions they obtain. All too frequently, the district attorneys are
correct in their estimate of the electorate's voting habits. It follows, then,
that the more convictions district attorneys are able to win, the more
successful they think they are. Unfortunately, it is too easy for them to
fail to recognize reasonable doubt when they see it. In 1940, the follow-
ing testimony was presented to a subcommittee of the Senate Committee
of the Judiciary:
Senator Van Nuys. I suppose you will agree that it is as much
the duty of the judges and the district attorneys to defend the innocent
as it is to prosecute the guilty?
Mr. Sitnick. Yes, sir; and in that connection I spoke to a prosecutor
just the other day. We were discussing this very matter, and I told
him that was his duty; that an innocent man should not be prosecuted.
Senator Van Nuys. He should not be indicted.
Mr. Sitnick. No. "Well," this prosecutor said, "a man cannot be
on both sides of the fence at the same time. It is only human nature.
I am paid to prosecute people, and that is exactly what I am doing.
My feelings about the matter are immaterial."'
If this is the attitude, then, defendants are very much in need of the as-
sistance of counsel to see that courts render them the justice to which
they are entitled.
ANOTHER VOICE WITH THE MINORITY
In concluding this study of the right to counsel as it is or is not
guaranteed by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, the
author would like to add his voice to that of the minority of the Supreme
Court that objects to the "fair trial" rule as a guide to the interpretation
of the due process clause, at least in respect to the right to counsel.
We have seen that, following the rule of stare decisis, the majority
refuse to overrule the doctrine of Barron v. Baltimore64 so as to make
63. Hearing before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary on
S.1845 and S.2871, Public Defender for the District of Columbia, 76th Cong., 3rd
Session 45 (1940).
64. 7 Peters (U.S.) 243 (1833).
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the first eight amendments applicable to the states. Instead, the Court
continues to subscribe to the rule of the Hebert case 65 which states that
all that the fourteenth amendment requires "is that the state action ...
shall be consistent with the fundamental principles of liberty and justice
which lie at the base of all our civil and political institutions and not
infrequently are designated as 'law of the land." 66 Behind the Hebert
decision is that of Hurtado v. California6' 7 for it was in the Hurtado case
that the formula for distinguishing between the "fundamental" and not-
so-fundamental rights was laid down. The reasoning in the Hurtado case
was that since no part of the Constitution can be said to be superfluous,
the Founding Fathers could not have meant the right to indictment by
grand jury to be included within the meaning of the due process clause
of the fifth amendment, as earlier in the amendment such an indictment
was specifically mentioned. Since due process in the fourteenth amend-
ment means exactly the same thing as due process in the fifth, it could
not be said that the fourteenth amendment guaranteed grand jury indict-
ment to those immeshed in the state courts.
It is submitted, however, that the minority members of the Court are
guilty of a tactical error every time they try to get the majority to over-
rule the Barron case and all that it implies. The principle of stare decisis
can still be maintained, and at the same time, by changing to a different
tack, the desired end can be obtained. It is not startlingly new to point
out that the Hurtado doctrine has been severely limited ever since the
Court decided Gitlow v. New York68 in 1925, and announced to the
world that freedom of speech was a fundamental right that was protected
from state abridgment by the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment. It seems, however, that this fundamental right of free speech was
not considered so fundamental to the Founding Fathers as Justice Sanford
would have us believe; it has long since been pointed out "that the right
of free speech was not included as one of a person's fundamental and in-
alienable rights in any Bill of Rights adopteed by any of the States prior
to the Federal Constitution .... The right to freedom of speech in gen-
eial, as a separate guaranty, was created for the first time in this country
by the First Amendment to the Constitution. 6 Since the first breach of
the Hurtado doctrine, the Court has incorporated into the liberty of the
fourteenth amendment freedom of religion, presses, assembly, and the
right to be protected from unreasonable searches and seizures. The
65. Hebert v. Louisiana, 272 U.S. 312 (1926).
66. Id. at 316.
67. 110 U.S. 516 (1884).
68. 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
69. Warren, The New "Liberty" Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 39 HARV. L
REv. 460-1 (1926).
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Hurtado doctrine has been limited in other cases as well, particularly in
the direction of incorporating substantive economic rights into due
process. 70 The Court stepped out in the right direction in 1932 when,
in Powell v. Alabama7l it included the right to counsel as a fundamental
right protected by due process; since then, however, the majority has
taken a step backwards by limiting the application of the Powell rule.
In even a more direct frontal attack, the Court stated in reference to jury
trials that "the two provisions [article III, and the sixth amendment]
mean substantially the same thing."72  Here then is a situation where
one part of the Constitution could be said to be superfluous, despite the
contrary reasoning in the Hurtado case. Here is precedent which could
make way for the Court to rule that due process of the Fifth amendment
includes the right to counsel and requires assignment of counsel to in-
digent defendants in all cases. It could be further argued, that due process
under the fifth and fourteenth amendments mean essentially the same
thing. Thus the states too would be required to assign counsel to in-
digent defendants in all criminal actions. Such a holding would be mere-
ly the logical extension of a firmly established line of precedents. The
objective would be achieved, yet it would not be necessary to upset Bar-
ron v. Baltimore.
A second line of attack is to use the reasoning of the Court in creating
a right to counsel in the federal courts to support the same right in the
state courts. Ordinarily, one does not speak in terms of the Supreme
Court creating rights, but apparently this is exactly what the Court has
done with respect to the right to counsel in federal courts.
The section in the first Federal Judiciary Act73 that pertains to the
right to the assistance of counsel is still on the statute books, with much
of the original language still intact: "In all the courts of the United States
the parties may plead and conduct their own cases personally or by coun-
sel as, by the rules of such courts, respectively, are permitted to manage
and conduct causes therein."74  In the same manner, part of the first
Federal Crimes Act75 is still the law of the land:
Whoever is indicted for treason or other capital crime shall be al-
lowed to make his full defense by counsel learned in the law; and the
court before which he is tried, or some judge thereof, shall immediately,
upon his request, assign to him such counsel, not exceeding two, as
he may desire, who shall have free access to him at all reasonable hours.
70. See p. 217 supra.
71. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
72. Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 298 (1930).
73. Act of September 24, 1789, c. 20, sec. 35, Ist Congress, 1st Session.
74. 28 U.S.C. § 1654 (1952).
75. Act of April 30, 1790, c. 9, sec. 29, 1st Congress, 2nd Session.
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He shall be allowed, in his defense to make any proof that he can pro-
duce by lawful witnesses, and shall have the like process of the court
to compel his witnesses to appear at his trial, as is usually granted
to compel witnesses to appear on behalf of the prosecution '
To these sections, however, there has been added a third, i.e., that which
incorporated the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure into statutory law.7
Rule 44 provides that "if the defendant appears in court without counsel,
the court shall advise him of his right to counsel and assign counsel to
represent him at every stage of the proceeding unless he elects to proceed
without counsel or is able to obtain counsel."78  The phrase "every stage
of the proceedings" means all phases in court; thus, according to the
Rules, it is not necessary to assign counsel at preliminary hearings. How-
ever, Rule 5 (b) provides that the hearing commissioner must inform the
defendant of his right to retain counsel and that the commissioner must
allow the defendant a reasonable amount of time to obtain counsel if he
chooses to do so.79
Thus, according to both the Constitution and the statutes (until the
adoption of Rule 44) the right to the assistance of counsel, in theory at
least, was a right to obtain counsel of one's own choosing and at one's
own expense; assignment of counsel was not contemplated. The law re-
quired that counsel be assigned only in cases of treason or other capital
offenses. Prior to Powell v. Alabamas ° few if any cases reached the
United States Supreme Court that concerned the right of indigent de-
fendants to have the assistance of counsel in criminal cases; it is neces-
sary, therefore, to turn to the lower federal courts to determine what the
right meant in practice, and here the practice was not at all uniform.
Some courts appointed counsel if the defendant had none of his own and
was charged with a serious offense. Other courts did not assign counsel
unless the defendant expressly asked that the court do so. And few
courts assigned counsel to a defendant who intended to plead guilty.8 '
In 1938 (ten years before Rule 44 had statutory implementation) the
picture changed radically. Holtzoff correctly treats Johnson v. Zerbst
m
as a cause celebre in the history of federal constitutional and criminal law.
76. 18 U.S.C. § 3005 (1952).
77. 18 U.S.C. § 3006 (1952).
78. Rule 44, without statutory support, became effective March 21, 1946.
79. Rule 40 (b) (1,2) accords the defendant the same right when (a) he is ar-
rested with a warrant issued in another state at a place 100 miles or more from the
place of arrest, or (b) he is arrested without a warrant for an offense committed in
another state at a place 100 miles or more from the place of arrest.
80. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
81. Holtzoff, The Right to Counsel Under the Sixth Amendment, 20 N.Y.U.L.
Rlv. 7-8 (1944).
82. 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
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The facts of this case are as follows: Johnson was charged with possessing
and passing counterfeit $20 Federal Reserve Notes on November 24,
1934. He was kept in jail for lack of bail until January 21, 1935, at
which time he was indicted. On January 23rd he was given notice of the
indictment, and the same day was arraigned, tried, convicted, and sen-
tenced to four and a half years in the penitentiary. He had counsel at
the preliminary hearing but was unable to employ counsel for the trial.
On May 15, 1935 he filed application for appeal (still without counsel)
but it was denied because it was filed too late. While in the penitentiary
he twice filed for writs of habeas corpus, but these were denied by the
district court, the judge holding that the proceedings depriving the peti-
tioner of his constitutional right to the assistance of counsel were not
sufficient "to make the trial void and justify its annulment in a habeas
corpus proceeding, but that they constituted trial errors which could only
be corrected on appeal." The circuit court of appeals affirmed the
district court, whereupon the case was brought to the Supreme Court
on certiorari. There, Mr. Justice Black said for the Court that ". . . the
Sixth Amendment withholds from Federal Courts in all criminal proceed-
ings, the power and authority to deprive an accused of his life or liberty
unless he has or waives the assistance of Counsel. '83 The Court, in effect,
held that where a defendant in a federal criminal proceeding is without
counsel at the trial and does not effectively waive counsel, a judgment
against such defendant is void because the trial court loses its jurisdic-
tion.84
As a result of this decision, the present practice in the federal courts
is to ask the defendant if he is represented by counsel; if he is not, he is
told of his right to have the assistance of counsel and asked if he desires
the court to appoint counsel to assist him. If he replies affirmatively,
the court first satisfies itself that the defendant is unable to employ his
own counsel because of lack of funds, and then assigns counsel to repre-
sent him. If the defendant wishes to waive his right to counsel, the court
is obligated to determine that the waiver is intelligently performed, and
a notation is made in the record to that effect.
We are now in position to examine what the majority of the Supreme
Court has itself said about the right to counsel in the federal courts. In
a recent case coming from a state court, the Supreme Court noted that:
The practice in the federal courts as to the right of the accused to
have the assistance of counsel is derived from the Sixth Amendment
which expressly requires that, in all criminal prosecutions in the courts
of the United States, the accused shall have the assistance of counsel
for his defense. There is no proof possible that the same practice would
83. Id. at 463.
84. Id. at 468.
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have developed had there been no specific provision on the subject in
the Sixth Amendment.... Furthermore, at the time of the trial of his
case in 1938, the rule of practice even in the federal courts was not as
clear as it is today. The federal statutes were then, and they are now,
in practically the same form as they were when they were enacted in
1789 and 1790. They provided merely for a right of representation in
the federal courts by the accused's own counsel and required assignment
of counsel only on accusations for treason or other capital crimes. In
fact, until the decision in this court in May, 1938 . . . in Johnson v.
Zerbst, . . . there was little in the decisions of any courts to indicate
that the practice in the federal courts, except in capital cases, required
appointment of counsel to assist the accused in his defense, as contrasted
with the recognized right of the accused to be represented by counsel of
his own if he so desired. (Emphasis added)."
Yet, as we know, Johnson v. Zerbst declared that federal courts lose juris-
diction if a defendant does not have counsel and is unable to obtain coun-
sel; from this it was held to follow that federal courts are required to ap-
point counsel to assist all indigent defendants. The rationale behind this
reasoning has been cited elsewhere.8 6  While the step is to be applauded,
the fact remains that the Supreme Court, of its own volition, has seen fit
to create a right which was unknown to the Framers, and, in fact, was un-
known all through our constitutional history until 1938 when the Court
announced its decision!8 7 At this point, the words of Justice Douglas
should be recalled: "I do not think that the constitutional standards of
fairness depend upon what court an accused is in . 8.8.."' Granted the
Bill of Rights is not applicable to the states. The fourteenth amendment,
however, is and there is no more valid precedent for creating mandatory
assignment of counsel for indigents in the federal courts than there is for
those in the state courts. If the Court creates a two-way street for stare
decisis the majority cannot logically claim that it is required to travel only
in one direction.
The criminal appellate court of Texas recently observed that:
. . . as applied to a criminal trial, denial of due process is the failure
to observe that fundamental fairness essential to the very concept of
justice....
There is no escape from the conclusion that the Supreme Court of
the United States has potential jurisdiction in all State cases where it
is claimed by the accused that the conviction was based upon his in-
voluntary confession. ...
The difficult feature of our position rests in the fact that we are
called upon to determine the question from a dual standpoint - first,
under the laws and decisions of this State and second, under the deci-
sions of the Supreme Court of the United States. ...
85. Bute v. Iillinois, 333 U.S. 640, 660-1 (1948).
86. Note 16, supra.
87. Rackow, The Right to Counsel: English and American Precedents, 11 THE
WILLIAM AND MARY Q. 3 (1954).
88. Bute v. Illinois, 333 U.S. 640, 678 (1948). Dissent of Justice Douglas.
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If the Supreme Court would prescribe some formula by which we
may be guided, our task would be much easier.....
It is suggested that if a formula is adopted in "right to counsel" cases,
it be Rule 44 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, at present ap-
plicable only to federal courts.90
Much would be accomplished if the majority on the Court would
recognize that the sixth amendment guarantees the right of an accused
the assistance of counsel when the defendant employs his own, and that
the right of an indigent defendant in the federal courts to have counsel
assigned depends upon the due process clause of the fifth amendment.91
If this step were taken, it would be an easy matter to extend the right of
assignment of counsel to indigent defendants in the state courts as an
application of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
The majority may then argue that we would be back to the "fair trial"
rule. That may be, but we would be there on a different basis, because
by definition the lack of counsel would make the trial unfair.
89. Newman v. State, 148 Tex. Crim. 645, 651-2 (1945).
90. There is little disagreement among the members of the Supreme Court on
either the principle behind this rule or the application of the rule to specific cases.
91. FREUND, ON UNDERSTANDING THE SUPREM COURT, 34-5 (1949).
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